Trust Center
Facial Recognition & Biometrics Policy
This is a deliberately separate document. We don't bury our position on biometrics inside a longer privacy notice — it's the single most important promise we make to the public.
Effective date: April 28, 2026
Last updated: April 28, 2026
Watchful does not perform, store, or process facial recognition under any circumstance.
We do not extract, derive, infer, transmit, or retain any biometric identifier from the cameras we monitor. This applies to every Subscriber, every product, every region, and every model we run. There is no “disabled by default” setting to flip on; the capability is not built.
This policy is binding on Watchful Systems, LLC (US) and Watchful Limited (NZ/AU), and on every subprocessor we engage.
What we do not do
The following are not capabilities of the Watchful Platform, Quill AI, or any associated service. They are not enabled for any Subscriber and cannot be enabled by configuration:
- Facial recognition or facial identification — no faceprints, face embeddings, face templates, or face-matching against any database (internal, customer-supplied, or public).
- Voice recognition or speaker identification — no voiceprints or speaker embeddings.
- Gait recognition or gait-based identification — no gait signatures, stride embeddings, or movement-pattern biometrics.
- Iris, retina, or eye-vein recognition.
- Fingerprint or palm-print recognition.
- Re-identification of an individual across separate Subscribers' camera networks. This is architecturally prevented, not just policy-prevented.
- Persistent profiles of members of the public — no PII (names, identification numbers, addresses) is stored about people detected on CCTV.
- Sale, disclosure, or sharing of biometric data to any third party — we cannot sell what we do not collect.
What our AI actually does
Watchful's models classify events and objects, not people. The output of our perception stack is a structured event such as “person detected in restricted area at 02:14 AM” — not “this is John Smith”.
| Capability | What it produces | What it does not |
|---|---|---|
| Object detection | Bounding boxes for classes like person, vehicle, bicycle, package. | It does not identify which person or which vehicle — only that one is present. |
| Event classification | Categorical labels like 'loitering', 'tailgating', 'after-hours entry', 'vehicle stopped'. | It does not link events across days or build a behavioural profile of a known individual. |
| Live incident tracking | Within a single active incident, the system produces a description of the offender or target in the scene — clothing, height, build, and other relevant visual cues — together with images across one Subscriber's camera network to support localised tracking for the duration of that incident. The principle: if a human watching the same cameras could follow the person, the system can help them; if a human couldn't reasonably complete the task due to scale (thousands of cameras, days of footage), the system won't either. | It does not allow searching for individuals, building ongoing or historical tracks, replaying movement after the incident ends, or cross-referencing footage to any other Subscriber's network. |
| Anomaly scoring | A numerical score indicating how unusual a scene is relative to the camera's baseline. | It does not score people. The baseline is per-camera, not per-individual. |
| Natural-language summaries (Quill) | An incident summary describing the event — 'Two vehicles entered the lot at 03:02 and remained for 11 minutes'. | Quill never names, identifies, or describes individuals by personal characteristics intended to identify them. |
Demographic descriptors in confirmed-incident reports
Watchful's models can produce coarse demographic descriptors — estimates of age range, gender presentation, or ethnicity visible in a scene. We use these descriptors in one narrow circumstance, and one only:
- Only for confirmed incidents. Demographic descriptors are generated only after a security event has been confirmed by an operator and the incident meets the threshold for an investigation report (for example, a verified intrusion, assault, theft, or other reportable event).
- Only to compile the investigation report. The descriptors are included in the incident report so that responders, the Subscriber, and law enforcement can describe and locate the individuals involved (e.g., "two adults, one wearing a red jacket"). They are not produced for routine monitoring, analytics, marketing, or model training.
- Not biometric identifiers. These are scene-relative, perceptual descriptors — the same kind of information a human operator would write in a witness statement. They are not faceprints, voiceprints, gait signatures, or any other unique biometric template, and they cannot be used to match an individual against a database.
- Tenant-bounded and incident-bounded. Descriptors live in the incident report for that Subscriber only, follow the retention schedule that applies to incident reports, and are never used to track individuals across Subscribers or build demographic profiles.
Subscribers may opt out of demographic descriptors in incident reports by request. Operators are trained to apply this capability only when it materially helps respond to or document a confirmed incident.
Incident-scoped tracking is not biometric tracking
During a live security incident, the Platform may help an operator follow the same person or vehicle across cameras owned by the same Subscriber so they can coordinate an effective response. This is not facial recognition and not biometric processing. It is:
- scene-relative. The system uses appearance cues within the moment (clothing colour, vehicle silhouette, position) — not a stored template of any specific person or vehicle.
- incident-bounded. The track exists only for the duration of the active incident and is not retained, indexed, or replayable as an identity record.
- tenant-bounded. The track cannot extend beyond the Subscriber's own cameras. Cross-Subscriber tracking is architecturally blocked at the data layer.
- not an identity claim. The system does not assert who the person is — only that the same shape was at camera A and then at camera B during the same incident.
Architectural guarantees
Promises in policy are only as good as the architecture under them. The following technical controls make biometric processing not just forbidden but infeasible:
- No biometric encoders. Our production model stack does not contain facial-recognition, voice-recognition, or gait models. None are deployed, none are loaded on inference servers.
- Per-Subscriber isolation. Subscriber video, audio, and analytics live in logically isolated tenant boundaries. Models cannot cross those boundaries to learn or match against another Subscriber's data.
- No biometric training data. Watchful does not train models on biometric datasets, face datasets, or identified persons. Subscriber footage used for model improvement is consented, scoped, and used only to improve event/object detection.
- Output schema does not allow identity. The event schema produced by our perception layer does not contain a personal-identifier field. There is no “identity” column to populate.
- Audit logs. Model deployments, dataset usage, and schema changes are logged and reviewed under our SOC 2 controls, so any attempt to introduce biometric capability would be visible.
Regulatory alignment
By not collecting biometric identifiers in the first place, Watchful stays clear of the obligations that apply to biometric processors under the world's strictest regimes. The list below is illustrative, not exhaustive:
- Illinois BIPA — we do not collect, capture, or otherwise obtain “biometric identifiers” or “biometric information” as defined by the Act.
- Texas CUBI (Bus. & Com. Code §503.001) — we do not capture biometric identifiers for a commercial purpose.
- Washington RCW 19.375 — we do not enroll biometric identifiers in a database for a commercial purpose.
- NZ Privacy Act 2020 & Biometric Processing Code — we do not undertake biometric processing as defined by the Privacy Commissioner's biometric guidance, and have no obligation to seek authorization for it.
- Australian Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) — we do not collect biometric information or biometric templates, which are sensitive information under APP 3.
- EU/UK GDPR Article 9 — we do not process special categories of personal data (biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person).
If a future law or Subscriber requirement introduces a use case that would change this position, we will publish an update to this policy and notify affected Subscribers in advance.
Verifying our commitment
We are happy to support security and procurement teams who need to verify these claims. Available on request:
- an architectural overview of the perception stack and tenant isolation model;
- a model inventory describing the classes our detectors output;
- a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) summary covering our AI processing;
- confirmation, on Watchful letterhead, that no facial recognition or biometric identification capability is deployed; and
- access to relevant SOC 2 controls and evidence through our trust portal.
and we will respond within five business days.
Reporting a concern
If you believe Watchful or a Subscriber using the Platform is performing biometric processing in breach of this policy, please immediately. We treat reports of biometric misuse as a Sev-1 incident and will investigate within 24 hours.
Contact Us
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Privacy & data subject requests
Access, deletion, correction, opt-out, DPIA, or any data-protection question.
Security & incident reports
Vulnerability reports, security questionnaires, SOC 2 evidence, incident notifications.
Watchful Systems, LLC
Delaware LLC · United States
1300 Red River Street
Austin, TX 78701
United States
Watchful Limited
Limited Liability Company · New Zealand
57 Fort Street
Auckland 1010
New Zealand